In the late eighteenth century, the Durrani Empire was regarded as the only power capable of neutralizing the growing influence of the East India Company or supporting the waning Indian Muslim power. This is evident from records of the British East India Company, which viewed Zaman Shah Durrani, the emperor of Afghanistan, as a significant threat to its interests. While he had the potential to be a formidable adversary, internal conflicts prevented him from advancing beyond Lahore, forcing his return to Afghanistan.

Tipu Sultan made contact with Zaman Shah Durrani regarding the Marathas and the British in 1792. He placed two proposals before Zaman Shah. In the first, he advised the Afghan emperor to send one of his trusted noblemen to Delhi with the task of dethroning the ailing Mughal emperor and replacing him with another member of the imperial family. Once this was accomplished, the nobleman was to march south, while Tipu Sultan would raise the standard of jihad in his own quarter.

In the second plan, Tipu requested the Shah to come personally to Delhi, settle the government, and then leave behind a Wazir. This Wazir was to spend a year conquering neighboring territories, after which the Shah would reinforce his army with an additional force from Kabul. With this strengthened army, the Wazir would then advance into the Deccan. At that time, Zaman Shah gave an encouraging reply to Tipu’s proposals.

In 1796, Tipu sent two vakils, Mir Reza Ali and Mir Habibullah, to Zaman Shah’s court with secret offers. They left by sea, arriving at Kandahar, from where they informed the Shah of their intent to proceed to Kabul and convey the purpose of their mission. They carried with them five lakhs of rupees and valuable presents for the Shah. Upon meeting him, they requested that he send 20,000 horsemen and march himself into Hindustan. In return, Tipu pledged to pay the Shah a peshkash of three crores and to cover the expenses of the 20,000 horse. Many other Indian Nawabs also placed their hopes in Zaman Shah to save them from the impending domination of the British (Varma, Birendra. "Tipu Sultan’s Embassy to the Court of Zaman Shah." Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 33 (1971): 478–482).

Lord Wellesley, the Governor-General of the British in India in 1798, remarked:

“Every Muhammadan, even in the remotest region of the Deccan, waited with anxious expectation for the advance of the Champion of Islam.” (J.W. Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, p. 3)

Sir John Shore, an East India Company official, wrote to Dundas just before setting off on a trip to Lucknow (January 27, 1797):

“…He (the Nawab of Awadh) has earnestly solicited me to meet him, alarmed probably by an apprehension of Zaman Shah. I cannot yet bring my mind to entertain any fears on this account, but I have taken the same precautions as if I were morally certain of the Shah's approach. If he should reach Delhi, he can have no motive but the plunder of Lucknow... It has also been suggested that the Shah acts in concert with Tipu and by French intrigues; I am equally an infidel on this point, but at the same time aware of the influence which his success might have on the resolutions of Tipu and the politics of the Nizam.”

Accordingly, fifteen thousand British-Indian troops were stationed along the northern borders until the close of Zaman Shah’s invasion (Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu Sultan, p. 244).

The Durrani army of Zaman Shah was still highly potent and dangerous, much like in the time of his grandfather Ahmad Shah Durrani, as shown by the thorough thrashing Zaman Shah gave to the Sikh misls. The Sikhs’ failure against Zaman Shah greatly alarmed the British. They sought to turn the Persians against him, reasoning that as long as Zaman Shah was threatened from the west, he could never conduct a successful expedition into India. To this end, at the end of 1796, Captain Malcolm’s mission was dispatched to Persia to relieve India from the annual alarm of Shah Zaman’s invasion. Meanwhile, the British directed Mahdi Ali, their native agent in Persia, to support Shah Mahmud, Zaman Shah’s half-brother, with a grant of ten thousand rupees to incite rebellion.

Upon hearing of Shah Mahmud’s revolt, Zaman Shah abandoned his advance into India and returned to Afghanistan to confront his brother. After defeating him, Zaman Shah returned to Punjab in January 1798. Later that year, news reached him that Fath Ali, the ruler of Iran, had attacked Khurasan (in present-day Iran), then affiliated with the Durrani Empire. Once again, Zaman Shah hastened back to Afghanistan.

In 1799, Zaman Shah planned yet another expedition into India, but internal strife had exhausted his coffers. He could have led 200,000 men into the field if he had the money to pay them. Even the Qizilbashes refused to accompany him, ostensibly claiming they needed arms and funds to support their families. In reality, they were in league with the King of Persia, and on his instructions worked to weaken the Durrani army. At this critical time, Shah Zaman was continually deserted for want of the sinews of war.

The depletion of his treasury severely degraded the quality of his standing army. His artillery consisted of only twelve brass field guns and five hundred zamburaks (camel-mounted swivel guns). There were not more than 500 good horses in his army. Such was the force with which he planned an invasion of India. Persian activity in the west and internal intrigues shattered the Durrani army and kept the Shah at home. Finally, the death of Tipu Sultan dampened his designs on India—for the time being.